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a b s t r a c t
Voting systems are common tools in a variety of areas. This paper studies parameterized
computational complexity of control of Plurality, Condorcet and Approval voting systems,
respectively. The types of controls considered include adding or deleting candidates
or voters, under constructive or destructive setting. We obtain the following results:
(1) constructive control by adding candidates in Plurality voting is W[2]-hard with
respect to the parameter ‘‘number of added candidates’’, (2) destructive control by adding
candidates in Plurality voting is W[2]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of
added candidates’’, (3) constructive control by adding voters in Condorcet voting is
W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of added voters’’, (4) constructive
control by deleting voters in Condorcet voting is W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter
‘‘number of deleted voters’’, (5) constructive control by adding voters in Approval voting is
W[1]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of added voters’’, and (6) constructive
control by deleting voters in Approval voting is W[2]-hard with respect to the parameter
‘‘number of deleted voters’’.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Voting systems provide a general framework for preference aggregation, in which each agent expresses a preference
order over a set of candidates, and some voting rule [4] is applied to compute the winner(s). These systems are used not
only in political elections but also in a variety of other areas, for example, meta-search engines [9] and planning in multi-
agent systems [10].
In addition to work that focuses on winner(s) determination, researchers have spent much effort on studying, from the
computational complexity view, the potential dangers that various voting systems would face. The dangers most studied
so far include manipulation [1,7], control [2,13,17,19], and bribery [12,13]. This paper focuses on control of voting systems.
In their seminal paper [2], Bartholdi et al. put forward the following general control problem: Is it computationally hard
or easy for an authority conducting the voting procedure (called chair) to cause a distinguished candidate to be the unique
winner through control of the candidate or voter set? Hemaspaandra et al. [17] called this general problem as constructive
control problem and also put forward a complementary destructive control problem. While in constructive setting the chair
aims to ensure that a specified desirable candidate is the (unique) winner, in destructive setting the chair tries to ensure
that a specified detested candidate is not the (unique) winner.
With respect to different settings (constructive or destructive), different types of control (e.g. adding or deleting
candidates or voters), and different voting systems, different variants of control problem can be formed. Variants of control
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Table 1
Summary of results.
Plurality Condorcet Approval
Control by Con. Des. Con. Des. Con. Des.
AC W[2]-hard W[2]-hard upslope upslope upslope upslope
DC W[2]-hard[3] W[1]-hard[3] upslope upslope upslope upslope
AV upslope upslope W[1]-hard upslope W[1]-hard upslope
DV upslope upslope W[1]-hard upslope W[2]-hard upslope
Results new to this paper are in boldface. AC= Adding Candidates, DC=Deleting Candidates,
AV= Adding Voters, DV= Deleting Voters. Con.= Constructive, Des.= Destructive.
problem for Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval voting systemwas studied in [11]. The computational complexity
of variants of control problems (with respect to ten types of control and constructive and destructive settings) of Plurality,
Condorcet and Approval voting systems obtained so far by researchers were summarized in [17]. We are interested in four
(out of the ten) types of controls: adding or deleting candidates or voters. We can see from the summary that, with respect
to these four types of controls, eight variants of control problem are NP-hard.1 Although NP-hardness can in theory be a
barrier to the implementation of certain control, more theoretical analysis is necessary.
More recently, some researchers have started to study the computational complexity of the control problem under
parameterized complexity framework [8,15,20], e.g., [3,14]. A review can be found in [18]. We refer readers to [3] for
a review of the motivations. In practice, it is reasonable to expect that, in some cases, the added/deleted candidates/voters
are in a small amount compared to the main body of already qualified candidates or registered voters, for the chair to
escape detection of his (or her)malicious aim. So, the number of added/deleted candidates/voters are reasonably considered
as ‘‘natural’’ parameters of the problem. Betzler and Uhlmann [3] studied two of the eight variants of control problem,
which are NP-hard as mentioned above. They proved that, with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of deleted candidates’’,
constructive control of Plurality voting by deleting candidates is W [2]-hard and destructive control of Plurality voting by
deleting candidates isW [1]-hard. To the best of our knowledge, parameterized complexity of the other six variants of control
problem are still open. We study them in this paper. For this purpose, with the number of added or deleted candidates or
voters as parameter, we first re-formalize the six variants of control problem in a ‘‘parameterized’’ way. Then, we devise
parameterized reductions to prove the W [1]-hardness or W [2]-hardness of them, respectively. The results obtained are
summarized in Table 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe the six variants of control problem and
some notions and concepts used in this paper are introduced. In the following three sections, parameterized complexities
of these six variants of control problem are studied, respectively. Conclusion is given in the last section.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout this work, a voting system (or an election) consists of a set of candidates, a set of voters specified by their
preferences and a voting rule for selecting winner(s). The Plurality, Condorcet, and Approval voting rules are described as
follows:
Plurality: Each candidate receives one vote for each voter that prefers it first. The candidate with the most votes wins.
Condorcet: The candidate who would defeat any other in a pairwise Plurality voting wins. According to the Condorcet
Paradox, whenever there are at least three candidates, a Condorcet winner may not exist due to cycles in preferences [5].
However, whenever one does exist, a Condorcet winner is of course the unique winner.
Approval: Every voter either approves or disapproves of each candidate, and the candidate with the maximum number
of approvals wins.
Suppose there is a candidates set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}. In Plurality and Condorcet voting systems, for any two candidates
ci, cj ∈ C , if ci is preferred to cj, it is denoted by ci  cj. We assume that the preferences are transitive, strict (no ties),
and complete (for any two candidates ci and cj, ci  cj or cj  ci). A voter’s preferences are represented as a list like
ci1  ci2  · · ·  cim , where {ci1 , cim , . . . , cim} = C . Often in this paper, we insert one or more candidate subsets into
such preference list, where we assume some arbitrary, fixed order of the candidates within each subset. In Approval voting
system, a voter’s preferences are reflected by a 0/1 vector (1 for approval and 0 for disapproval).
Following a similar fashion in [2,17], we describe the six parameterized variants of control problem:
Constructive Control by Adding Candidates in Plurality Voting (Plurality-CC-AC)
Given: A set C of qualified candidates, a particular candidate c ∈ C , a set B of possible spoiler candidates, and a set P of
voters with preferences over C ∪ B.
Parameter: A positive integer k.
Question: Is there a subset B′, with |B′| 6 k, of B, whose entry into the election would assure that c is the unique winner?
1 A voting system is said to be immune to a type of control if a non-unique-winner can never be made the unique winner by this type of control, and is
said to be resistant to this type of control if the corresponding control problem is NP-hard, and vulnerable if polynomial-time solvable [17].
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Destructive Control by Adding Candidates in Plurality Voting (Plurality-DC-AC)
Given, Parameter: The same as in Plurality-CC-AC.
Question: Is there a subset B′, with |B′| 6 k, of B, whose entry into the election would assure that c is not the unique
winner?
Constructive Control by Adding Voters in Condorcet Voting (Condorcet-CC-AV)
Given: A set C of candidates, a particular candidate c ∈ C , a set P of registered voters and a set Q of unregistered voters
who could still register in time for the election (both P and Q have preferences over C).
Parameter: A positive integer k.
Question: Is there a subset Q ′, with |Q ′| 6 k, of Q , whose registration would assure that c is the unique winner?
Constructive Control by Deleting Voters in Condorcet Voting (Condorcet-CC-DV)
Given: A set C of candidates, a particular candidate c ∈ C , a set P of registered voters.
Parameter: A positive integer k.
Question: Is there a subset P ′, with |P ′| 6 k, of P , whose disenfranchisement would assure that c is the unique winner?
Constructive Control by Adding Voters in Approval Voting (Approval-CC-AV)
Given, Parameter, Question: The same as in Condorcet-CC-AV.
Constructive Control by Deleting Voters in Approval Voting (Approval-CC-DV)
Given, Parameter, Question: The same as in Condorcet-CC-DV.
Finally, we briefly introduce the relevant notions of parameterized complexity theory [8,15,20]. Given a parameterized
problem Π , it is called Fixed Parameter Tractable (or in the class FPT ) if there exists an algorithm solving it with running
time O(f (k)|I|O(1)), where k is the parameter, f is any recursive function, and (I, k) is an instance ofΠ . Otherwise (i.e., if it
is unlikely that any solving algorithm with running time O(f (k)|I|O(1)) exists forΠ ),Π is called fixed parameter intractable.
In fact, besidesW [1] andW [2], there is a hierarchy of parameterized complexity classes,
W [1] ⊆ W [2] ⊆ · · · ⊆ W [t] ⊆ · · · ,
to capture the property of fixed parameter intractability.
To introduce the concepts of W [1]-hardness and W [2]-hardness, we first introduce the concept of FPT -reduction. A
parameterized problemΠ is FPT -reducible to a parameterized problemΠ ′ if there is an algorithm that on a given instance
(I, k) ofΠ produces an instance (I ′, k′) ofΠ ′ in time O(f (k)|I|O(1)), where k′ is only dependent on k and independent of |I|,
k′ 6 g(k), and f and g are recursive functions, such that (I, k) is a yes-instance ofΠ if and only if (I ′, k′) is a yes-instance of
Π ′. FPT -reducible is transitive.
Following the same style of NP-completeness theory, a parameterized problemΠ is said to beW [1]-hard (W [2]-hard)
if all the problems inW [1] (W [2]) are FPT -reducible toΠ , and is said to beW [1]-complete (W [2]-complete) if in addition
Π is also in the classW [1] (W [2]). To prove that a parameterized problemΠ isW [1]-hard (W [2]-hard), we need to prove
that some knownW [1]-hard (W [2]-hard) parameterized problemΠ ′ is FPT -reducible toΠ .
We notice that not all polynomial-time reduction studied in NP-completeness theory can be translated into
parameterized reduction.
3. Plurality voting
Theorem 1. Constructive Control by Adding Candidates in Plurality voting is W [2]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number
of added candidates’’.
Proof. We show that Plurality-CC-AC isW [2]-hard by a FPT -reduction from aW [2]-complete parameterized Dominating
Set problem [8], which is formalized as follows:
Dominating Set
Given: A graph G = (V , E).
Parameter: A positive integer k.
Question: Does G have a dominating set with k or less elements?
Given a graph G = (V , E), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, and a set V ′ ⊆ V , where V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k}, V ′ is called a
k-element dominating set of G if and only if every vertex v ∈ V − V ′ is adjacent to at least one vertex in V ′ [16].
Given a Dominating Set instance Ids = (G = (V , E), k), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, we construct a Plurality-CC-AC
instance (P, C, B, c, k′) as follows:
• k′: Let k′ = k.
• C: C consists of two qualified candidates, c and c ′.
• B: For every vi ∈ V , we have a corresponding possible spoiler candidate. Let B = V .
• P: P consists of three blocks of voters: The 1st block consists of n + 1 voters who report the same preference list
c  c ′  B; the 2nd block consists of n voterswho report the samepreference list c ′  c  B; in the 3rd block, corresponding
to every vertex vi in V , there is a voter, who reports the preference list N[vi]  c ′  c  V −N[vi], where N[vi] is the closed
neighborhood of vi in G, i.e., N[vi] = {vj|(vi, vj) ∈ E} ∪ {vi}.
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It is easy to see that, before adding any candidates in B into the voting system, c ′ defeats c by exactly n − 1 votes in a
head-to-head contest against c. Thus, c ′ is the current winner.
We next show that if the instance Ids of Dominating Set has a k-element of dominating set if and only if k candidates in
B can be added into this election so that c defeats c ′ and all newly added candidates, and becomes the unique winner.
⇒: Suppose that there exists a dominating set V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} of size k inG; then add the corresponding candidates
into the election. By the definition of dominating set, each of the closed neighborhoods N[v1],N[v2], . . . ,N[vn] contains at
least one vertex v′j ∈ V ′ (1 6 j 6 k). Consequently, after the addition, c ′ loses n votes, left with a total of n votes. However,
none of the k newly added candidates obtains more than n votes. Thus, c , with remaining n + 1 votes, defeats all other
candidates and becomes the unique winner.
⇐: Now suppose that c can be made the unique winner by adding k candidates, v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k. Denote by V ′ the set of
newly added candidates, then V ′ ⊆ B. To make c defeat c ′, the k newly added candidates should decrease the votes for c ′ by
at least n. This means that every closed neighborhood of N[v1],N[v2], . . . ,N[vn] includes at least one element in V ′, or in
other words, every vertex vi ∈ V is adjacent to at least one vertex in V ′. By definition, V ′ forms a k-element dominating set
of G.
It is easy to see that the above Plurality-CC-AC instance can be constructed from the given Dominating Set instance Ids
in time O(f (k)|Ids|O(1)), where f is a recursive function. So, the problem Dominating Set is FPT -reducible to the problem
Plurality-CC-AC. 
We note thatW [2]-hardness of Plurality-CC-AC can also be proven by a slightly modification of the NP-hardness proof
of the same problem given in [2], where a polynomial-time reduction from Hitting Set problem is adopted. However, the
proof given in this work is simpler.
Theorem 2. Destructive Control by Adding Candidates in Plurality voting is W [2]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number
of added candidates’’.
Proof. This theorem can be similarly proved by exchanging the role of c and c ′ in the proof of Theorem 1. 
4. Condorcet voting
Theorem 3. Constructive Control by Adding Voters in Condorcet Voting is W [1]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of
added voters’’.
Proof. We show that Condorcet-CC-AV isW [1]-hard by a FPT -reduction fromW [1]-complete parameterized Perfect Code
problem [6], which is formalized as follows:
Perfect Code
Given: A graph G = (V , E).
Parameter: A positive integer k.
Question: Does G have a perfect code with k or less elements?
Given a graph G = (V , E), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, a subset V ′ ⊆ V , where V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k}, is called a k-
element perfect code of G if and only if, for every vertex vi ∈ V , |N[vi] ∩ V ′| = 1 or {N[v′1],N[v′2], . . . ,N[v′k]} is a partition
of V [16].
Given a Perfect Code instance Ipc = (G = (V , E), k), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, we construct a Condorcet-CC-AV
instance (P,Q , C, c, k′) as follows:
• k′: Let k′ = k.
• C: For every vi ∈ V , there are two corresponding candidates, bi and b˜i. Denote the set {bi|1 6 i 6 n} by B and the set
{b˜i|1 6 i 6 n} by B˜. Define candidate set C = {c} ∪ B ∪ B˜.
• P: P consists of k− 2 registered voters who report the same preference list B  c  B˜ and one registered voter who
reports the preference list c  B  B˜. Note that here we assume that k > 3. (For cases where k = 1 and 2, Condorcet-CC-AV
can be trivially solved by a brute-force method)
• Q : For every vertex vi ∈ V , we have a corresponding unregistered voter vi in Q (Note that here and in the text of the
proof that followswe use the same symbol to denote both a vertex in V and the corresponding voter inQ , and its implication
will be clear from the context.), whose preference list is
NC [bi]  B˜− NC [b˜i]  c  B− NC [bi]  NC [b˜i].
In the above preference list, bi and b˜i are the two candidates corresponding to vi, NC [bi] = {bj|(vi, vj) ∈ E} ∪ {bi} (that is
the set of candidates corresponding to vertices in N[vi]), and for convenience, it is also called the closed neighborhood of bi.
NC [b˜i] is similarly defined as NC [bi], i.e., NC [b˜i] = {b˜j|(vi, vj) ∈ E} ∪ {b˜i}.
In the constructed election, it is easy to see that, before adding any voters, c is not the Condorcet winner because in a
head-to-head contest against any candidate bi ∈ B, c does not obtain more votes than bi.
In what follows, we show that an instance Ipc of Perfect Code has a k-element of perfect code if and only if k voters from
Q can be added into the election to make c the Condorcet winner.
⇒: Suppose that there exists a perfect code V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} in G. Denote the corresponding candidates in B by
b′1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
k. Define B
′ = {b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k}.
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Let Q ′ = V ′ and add all the voters in Q ′ into the election. Next, we list the results of head-to-head contests of c against
every other candidate after this addition:
c vs. bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n): Fix some candidate bi. Since {N[v′1],N[v′2], . . . ,N[v′k]} is a partition of V , {NC [b′1],NC [b′2], . . . ,NC [b′k]}
is a partition of B and bi appears in exactly one of the closed neighborhoodsN[b′1],N[b′2], . . . ,N[b′k]. This means that exactly
one voter in Q ′ prefers bi to c. Suppose this voter is v′j , 1 6 j 6 k. Recall that before adding any voters, bi has k − 3 more
votes than c. Adding voter v′j increases the value by 1 and adding the other k− 1 voters in Q ′ (who prefer c to bi) decreases
it by k− 1. In the end, c defeats bi by one vote.
c vs. b˜i (1 6 i 6 n): Fix some candidate b˜i. It is easy to see that, before adding any voters, c has k− 1 votes of advantage
over b˜i. For the abovementioned voter v′j , c is preferred to b˜i. Adding this voter increases the value by 1 and adding the other
k− 1 voters in Q ′ (who prefer b˜i to c) decreases it by k− 1. In the end, c defeats b˜i by one vote.
From the above list, we conclude that adding voters in Q ′ into the election makes c the Condorcet winner.
⇐: Now suppose that c will be made the Condorcet winner by adding k voters from Q . Denote the set of these voters
by Q ′. In the following, we make two claims. First, we claim that for each candidate bi ∈ B, Q ′ contains at most one voter
who prefers bi to c . To show that this claim is correct by way of contradiction, we fix some candidate bi and assume that
in Q ′ there are more than one voters who prefers bi to c. However, before adding any voters, bi has exactly k − 3 votes
of advantage over c in the head-to-head contest against c. If at least two voters who prefer bi to c are added then this
value increases by 2 to at least k − 1 and it is impossible to bring it below zero by adding at most k − 2 voters who
prefer c to bi, i.e., c cannot become the Condorcet winner. Thus a contradiction. Next, we claim that for each candidate
bi ∈ B, Q ′ contains at least one voter who prefers bi to c. To show that this claim is correct by way of contradiction, we
fix some candidate bi and assume that none of voters in Q ′ prefers bi to c . Consider the candidate b˜i, which corresponds
to the same vertex vi ∈ V as bi. If none of voters in Q ′ prefers bi to c then all the voters in Q ′ prefers b˜i to c . Recall that
before adding any voters c defeats b˜i by exactly k − 1 votes in the head-to-head contest against b˜i. Then adding all the
voters in Q ′ decreases this value to −1, i.e., b˜i defeats c by one vote and c cannot become the Condorcet winner. Thus
a contradiction. From the above two claims, we conclude that for each candidate bi ∈ B, Q ′ contains exactly one voter
who prefers bi to c. Thus {NC [b′1],NC [b′2], . . . ,NC [b′k]} forms a partition of set B. Correspondingly, {N[v′1],N[v′2], . . . ,N[v′k]}
forms a partition of V . Denote the set {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} by V ′, then V ′ ⊆ V and, by definition, V ′ is a k-element perfect code
of G.
It is easy to see that the above Condorcet-CC-AV instance can be constructed from the given Perfect Code instance
Ipc in time O(f (k)|Ipc |O(1)), where f is a recursive function. So, the problem Perfect Code is FPT -reducible to the problem
Condorcet-CC-AV. 
Theorem 4. Constructive Control by Deleting Voters in Condorcet Voting is W [1]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of
deleted voters’’.
Proof. We show that Condorcet-CC-DV isW [1]-hard by a FPT -reduction from Perfect Code problem defined as before.
Given a Perfect Code instance Ipc = (G = (V , E), k), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, we construct a Condorcet-CC-DV
instance (P, C, c, k′) as follows:
• k′: Let k′ = k.
• C: With every vi ∈ V , 1 6 i 6 n, we associate two candidates, bi and b˜i. Denote the set {bi|1 6 i 6 n} by B and the set
{b˜i|1 6 i 6 n} by B˜. Define candidate set C = B ∪ B˜ ∪ {c, c ′, c ′′}.
• P: P consists of 2 blocks of voters. The 1st block consists of n − k + 1 voters who report the same preference list
B˜  c  B  c ′  c ′′, one voter who reports the preference list c ′′  c  B˜  B  c ′, and n− 1 voters who report the same
preference list c ′′  B  c  B˜  c ′. In the 2nd block, for every vertex vi ∈ V , we have two corresponding voters, vi and v˙i,
where vi’s preference list is
c ′  c ′′  B− NC [bi]  NC [b˜i]  c  NC [bi]  B˜− NC [b˜i]
and v˙i’s preference list is
c ′  NC [bi]  B˜− NC [b˜i]  c  B− NC [i]  NC [b˜i]  c ′′,
where NC [bi] and NC [b˜i] are defined as before. Denote the voters set {vi|1 6 i 6 n} by D and the voters set {v˙i|1 6 i 6 n} by
D˙ respectively.
In this contrived election, it is easy to see that, before deleting any voters, c is not the Condorcet winner. In detail, c ′ and
c ′′ both defeat c by exactly k − 1 votes, and each candidate bi ∈ B has k − 3 votes of advantage over c . (Note that here we
assume that k > 3. For cases where k = 1 and 2, Condorcet-CC-DV can be trivially solved by a brute-force method.) The
only exceptions go for all b′i ∈ B˜, as c defeats each of b˜i by exactly k− 1 votes.
In what follows, we show that an instance Ipc of Perfect Code has a k-element of perfect code if and only if k voters can
be deleted from P to make c the Condorcet winner.
⇒: Suppose that there exists a perfect code V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} in G. Denote all the k voters corresponding to these k
vertices in D by P ′ and delete the voters in P ′ from P . Then, it is easy to check that c wins in the head-to-head contest against
every other candidate and becomes the Condorcet winner.
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⇐: Now suppose that c will be made the Condorcet winner by deleting k voters from P . It is easy to see that all these k
voters come from the 2nd block of P , because only voters from this block prefer c ′ to c . More precisely, these k voters should
be chosen from D other than D˙, because only voters in this set prefer c ′′ to c. Denote the set of these k voters by P ′. Then, as
in the proof of Theorem 3, by way of contradiction, we can prove the correctness of the following two claims: (1) For each
candidate bi ∈ B, P ′ contains at most one voter who prefers c to bi. (2) For each candidate bi ∈ B, P ′ contains at least one voter
who prefers c to bi. From these two claims, we conclude that for each candidate bi ∈ B, V ′ contains exactly one voter who
prefers c to bi. Thus {NC [b′1],NC [b′2], . . . ,NC [b′k]} forms a partition of set B. Correspondingly, {N[v′1],N[v′2], . . . ,N[v′k]} forms
a partition of V . Denote the set {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} by V ′, then V ′ ⊆ V and, by definition, V ′ is a k-element perfect code of G.
It is easy to see that the above Condorcet-CC-DV instance can be constructed from the given Perfect Code instance
Ipc in time O(f (k)|Ipc |O(1)), where f is a recursive function. So, the problem Perfect Code is FPT -reducible to the problem
Condorcet-CC-DV. 
5. Approval voting
Theorem 5. Constructive Control by Adding Voters in Approval Voting is W [1]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of
added voters’’.
Proof. We show that Approval-CC-AV isW [1]-hard by a FPT -reduction from Perfect Code problem defined as before.
Given a Perfect Code instance Ipc = (G = (V , E), k), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, we construct a Approval-CC-AV
instance (P,Q , C, c, k′) as follows:
• k′: Let k′ = k.
• C: For every vi ∈ V , we have two corresponding candidates, bi and b˜i. Denote the set {bi|1 6 i 6 n} by B and the set
{b˜i|1 6 i 6 n} by B˜. Define candidate set C = {c} ∪ B ∪ B˜.
• P: P consists of k− 2 registered voters who each approve of candidates in B and disapprove of candidates in {c} ∪ B˜.
Here we assume that k > 2.
• Q : In Q , for every vertex vi ∈ V (1 6 i 6 n), we have a corresponding unregistered voter vi (Note that in this proof we
use the same symbol to denote both a vertex in V and the corresponding voter in Q , and its implication will be clear from
the context.), who approves of candidates in the set c ∪NC [bi] ∪ (B˜−NC [b˜i]) and disapproves of all other candidates, where
NC [bi] and NC [b˜i] are defined as in the former section.
In the constructed election, it is obvious that before adding any voters, c , with zero votes, is not the unique winner.
We show that if the instance Ipc of Perfect Code has a k-element of perfect code if and only if k voters in Q can be added
to the election to make c the unique winner.
⇒: Suppose that there exists a perfect code V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} of size k in G. Denote the set of corresponding
candidates in B and B˜ by {b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k} and {b˜′1, b˜′2, . . . , b˜′k}, respectively. Denote the set of voters corresponding to
v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
k by Q
′. Then, add voters in Q ′ into the voting system. For any candidate bi (1 6 i 6 n) in B, as the corresponding
vertex vi is a member of exactly one of the closed neighborhoods N[v′1],N[v′2], . . . ,N[v′k], bi is a member of exactly one
of the closed neighborhoods NC [b′1],NC [b′2], . . . ,NC [b′k] and b˜i is a member of exactly one of the closed neighborhoods
NC [b˜′1],NC [b˜′2], . . . ,NC [b˜′k]. Thus, bi is approved of by exactly one voter in Q ′ and so is b˜i. Recall that before adding any
voters, both bi and b˜i have k−2 votes, and c has zero votes. After adding voters in Q ′, both bi and b˜i obtain k−1 votes, while
c obtains k votes. This means that c defeats all other candidates and becomes the unique winner.
⇐: Now suppose that c can be made the unique winner by adding k voters in Q . Denote these k voters by v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k,
respectively, and denote the set of them by Q ′. Then, by way of contradiction, it is not hard to prove the correctness of the
following two claims: (1) For each candidate bi ∈ B, there is at most one voter who approves of bi in Q ′. (2) for each candidate
bi ∈ B, there is at least one voter who approves of bi in Q ′. Based on these two claims, we conclude that every candidate bi ∈ B
is approved of by exactly one of the k added voters, i.e. bi is a member of exactly one of the closed neighborhoods NC [b′1],
NC [b′2], . . . , NC [b′k]. Thus {NC [b′1], NC [b′2], . . . , NC [b′k]} forms a partition of set B. Correspondingly, {N[v′1], N[v′2], . . . , N[v′k]}
forms a partition of V . Denote the set {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} by V ′, then V ′ ⊆ V and, by definition, V ′ is a k-element perfect code
of G.
It is easy to see that the above Approval-CC-AV instance can be constructed from the given Perfect Code instance
in time O(f (k)|Ipc |O(1)), where f is a recursive function. So, the problem Perfect Code is FPT -reducible to the problem
Approval-CC-AV. 
Theorem 6. Contructive Control by Deleting Voters in Approval Voting is W [2]-hard with respect to the parameter ‘‘number of
deleted voters’’.
Proof. We show that Approval-CC-DV isW [2]-hard by a FPT -reduction from Dominating Set problem defined as before.
Given a Dominating Set instance Ids = (G = (V , E), k) where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, we construct a Approval-CC-DV
instance (P, C, c, k′) as follows:
• k′: Let k′ = k.
• C: For every vertex vi ∈ V (1 6 i 6 n), we have a corresponding candidate bi. Denote the set of candidates
b1, b2, . . . , bn by B. C is defined as C = {c} ∪ B.
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• P: Corresponding to every vertex vi (1 6 i 6 n) in V , there are two voters, vi and v˙i, where vi approves of every
candidate in NC [bi] while v˙i approves of c and all candidates in B − NC [bi] (NC [bi] is defined as before). Denote the voters
set {vi|1 6 i 6 n} by D and the voters set {v˙i|1 6 i 6 n} by D˙, respectively. Note that, similarly as before, here we use the
symbol to denote both a vertex in V and the corresponding voter in D.
In this contrived election, before deleting any voters, c is not the unique winner, because all candidates have n votes.
We show that the instance Ids has a k-element of dominating set if and only if k voters can be deleted from P to make c
the unique winner.
⇒: Suppose that there exists a dominating set V ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k} in G. Denote the set of corresponding voters in
D by P ′, and the k corresponding candidates by b′1, b
′
2, . . . , b
′
k, respectively. For any candidate bi (1 6 i 6 n) in B, as the
corresponding vertex vi is a member of at least one of the closed neighborhoods N[v′1], N[v′2], . . . , N[v′k], bi is a member of at
least one of closed neighborhoods NC [b′1], NC [b′2], . . . , NC [b′k]. Thus, bi is approved of by at least one voter in P ′. Delete all the
voters in P ′. It can be seen that, after the deletion, bi’s votes decrease by at least one while c ’s votes remain unchanged. So,
in a head-to-head contest against any other candidate, c defeats him (or her) by at least one vote and becomes the unique
winner.
⇐: Now suppose that c can bemade the uniquewinner by deleting k voters from P .Without loss of generality, we assume
the deleted voters come from the set {v1, v2, . . . , vn} (not {v˙1, v˙2, . . . , v˙n}). Denote the deleted voters by v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k,
respectively. Let P ′ = {v′1, v′2, . . . , v′k}. Recall that before deleting any voters, c and other candidates all have n votes. Thus,
for c to have more votes than any other candidates, every bi ∈ B must be approved of by at least one voter in P ′. In other
words, candidate bimust be amember of at least one of closed neighborhoods NC [b′1],NC [b′2], . . . ,NC [b′k]. Correspondingly,
every vertex vi ∈ V must be a member of at least one of closed neighborhoods N[v′1],N[v′2], . . . ,N[v′k], or in other words,
every vertex vi ∈ V must be adjacent to at least on vertex in V ′ (here V ′ = P ′). By definition, set V ′ forms a dominating set
of graph G.
It is also easy to see that the above Approval-CC-DV instance can be constructed from the givenDominating Set instance
Ids in time O(f (k)|Ids|O(1)), where f is a recursive function. So, the problem Dominating Set is FPT -reducible to the problem
Approval-CC-DV. 
6. Conclusion
The parameterized computational complexity of several variants of control problem in Plurality, Condorcet and Approval
voting systems are studied. From a parameterized complexity point of view, we conclude that Plurality is resistant to
constructive/destructive adding candidates control, and both Condorcet and Approval voting systems are resistant to
constructive adding/deleting voters control.
In future, we will study the computational complexity of control problem in other voting systems, under both NP-
completeness theory framework and parameterized complexity theory framework. Another future research direction is
to determine the exact parameterized complexity class each of the variants of control problems studied above belongs to.
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